Judgment of the IMTFE (Chapter VII, The Pacific War (pp. 963-999))
Navy Order for Attack
The Commander of the Japanese Combined Fleets, Yamamoto, visited the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, in Tokyo on 3rd November and gave his approval to the final draft of the Combined Fleet Operations Order which had been under preparation for months. The order provided for the execution of the advance of the South by attacking Singapore and completing an enveloping movement against the Netherlands East Indies in the manner originally planned on 4th October 1940. It also provided for the attack upon the Philippines which OSHIMA had mentioned to Ribbentrop months before as being under preparation. These attacks were to be covered by an attack upon Pearl Harbor to destroy the United States Pacific Fleet. The British and Americans were to be driven from China by attacks upon Hong Kong and Shanghai, and other incidental operations were included. The order read:
The Empire is expecting war to break out with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y-Day) for commencement of operations (sic) and announcing 'First Preparations for War'.
The order then continued with instructions that upon the announcement of Y-Day, all fleets and forces, without further special orders, would organize and complete battle preparations, and when directed by their commanding officers, the various fleets and forces would proceed to their rendezvous and wait in readiness for the attack. The order provided further:
The time for outbreak of war (X-Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters Order. This order will be given several days in advance.
After 0000 hours, X-Day, a state of war will exist. Each force will commence operations according to plan.
After leaving the Imperial Conference on 5th November, the Chief of the Naval General
Staff ordered Yamamoto to issue the order, and it was issued on that day.
Proposal "A" Presented 7 November 1941
Ambassador Nomura presented his "Proposal A" to Mr. Hull on 7th November. On 10th November, he read a memorandum explaining that proposal to the President of the United States, but the memorandum was vague and uncertain. On the day Nomura was reading that memorandum, Vice-Admiral Nagumo, who was to command the carrier task force in its attack upon Pearl Harbor, issued his order to his task force to rendezvous at Tankan Wan (Hitokappu Bay, Etorofu island, Kuriles). SHIMADA said that the order directed all ships of the task force to complete battle preparations by 20th November and proceed to the rendezvous under strict security regulations. Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 3 of 10th November fixed 8th December as "X-Day". That was the day when, after 0000hours, a state of war would exist.
On 12th November, Mr. Hull told Nomura that the Japanese proposal was being studied and that he hoped to reply to it on the 15th.
The United States Government was maintaining close contact with the British, Netherlands and Chinese Governments during the conduct of the negotiations and there was an understanding that if the Japanese government should agree to the four basic principles which Mr. Hull and the President had enunciated, those Governments would be consulted before any agreement would be reached upon specific problems in the Far East and the Pacific Area. Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared on 10th November, in the course of a speech delivered in London: "We do not know whether the efforts of the United States to preserve peace in the Pacific will be successful. But, if they fail, I take this occasion to say -- and it is my duty to say -- that should the United States be involved in a war with Japan, a british declaration will follow within an hour". The British Ambassador called upon TOGO the next day to explain his Governments' position. During the course of the conversation, TOGO informed the Ambassador that the negotiations had entered their final phase, that Japan had made her final proposal, and that if the United States rejected it, there would be no reason to continue negotiations further.
The Liaison Conferences continued almost daily for the decision of questions relating to the attack. The conference of 11th November decided upon the policy to overthrow quickly the American, British and Dutch bases in the Far East, to establish Japanese self-sufficiency, and at the same time to hasten the surrender of the Chungking Regime. The plan was to concentrate on Great Britain with the cooperation of the Axis Powers so as to defeat that country first and then deprive America of her will to continue the war. Japanese troops were moving into position. The air units were assembling at Saigon for their attack upon Singapore. The ships which were to make up the carrier task force for the attack upon Pearl Harbor were sailing from Japanese ports bound for their rendezvous at Tankan Wan.
The United States Government impliedly rejected the "ultimatum" of "Proposal A" presented by Nomura on 7th November when Mr. Hull delivered a memorandum to Nomura on 15th November replying to that proposal. Mr. Hull pointed out that the proposals regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops were indefinite and uncertain, as they did not specify a time limit for such withdrawal nor the areas to be evacuated. He said also that the United States could not undertake that other Powers would give universal application to the principle of non-discrimination in trade. No reply was ever received to this memorandum. Nomura had advised TOGO the day before that the United States Government was determined to do everything possible short of war to stop further Japanese military moves, either southward or northward; and that, rather than yield on that point, they would not hesitate to fight, as they had no intention of committing another mistake like that of Munich.
After receiving the memorandum from Mr. Hull, TOGO began final preparations for the attack. He cabled the Japanese Consul-General in Honolulu to take extra care to preserve secrecy, but to make his reports on ships in harbor at least twice a week, as the situation was most critical. Nomura had asked for an extension of time, but TOGO replied ot him on the 16th as follows: "I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations and there will be no change". He instructed Nomura to press for a solution on the basis of the proposals "A" and "B" and to do his best to bring about an immediate solution. TOGO then turned his attention to negotiation of an agreement with the German Government not to conclude a separate peace in case Japan became involved in war with the United States, regardless of the cause of the war. The agreement was reached on 21st November.
Proposal "B" 20th November 1941
Special Envoy Kurusu arrived in Washington on 15th November 1941, but he did not present any new proposals until he and Nomura presented to Mr. Hull the alternative "Proposal B" on 20th November. This was the alternative which TOGO had transmitted to Nomura on 4th November and which had been approved by the Imperial Conference on 5th November. TOGO had instructed Nomura not to present "Proposal B" until it became apparent that an agreement could not be reached on "Proposal A". This "Proposal B" was a completely new draft proposal and was not intended as an amendment of prior proposals. It made no mention of the Tripartite Pact, the question of removal of troops from China, or the principle of non-discrimination in trade. Japan offered to withdraw her troops from southern French Indo-China upon acceptance of the proposals and to withdraw them from northern French Indo-China upon negotiation of a peace treaty with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, or upon the conclusion of an equitable peace in the Pacific. In return for these so-called concessions, the United States was asked to agree not to interfere with the negotiation of the peace treaty with generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and to agree to furnish Japan with oil. The proposal also provided for a mutual agreement to cooperate in the acquisition and exploitation of natural resources in the Netherlands East Indies and to cooperate in the restoration of commercial relations to the situation existing before issuance of the freezing orders.
The American Government arrived at the conclusion that the Proposal B was not sincere in view of information contained in Japanese messages which the American intelligence service had intercepted and decoded, and in view of the fact that troops withdrawn from southern French indo-China were to be maintained in northern French Indo-China and on Hainan Island, whence they could be brought back in a day or two. Japan proposed to maintain the position she had seized vis-a-vis southern French Indo-China, a position which threatened the countries to the south and threatened the trade routes. The American Government considered that acceptance of this proposal would amount to condonation of Japan;'s past aggression and approval of unlimited conquest by Japan in the future, as well as abandonment of the principles of the United States of America and the betrayal of China.
Mr. Hull called a conference of the Ambassadors and Ministers from Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands on the morning of 22nd November and asked for their opinions on the Japanese proposals. This conference agreed that if Japan sincerely desired peace and firmly intended to adhere to a peaceful policy, they would welcome it and would be glad to cooperate in resuming normal trade relations with Japan, but that the proposals and statements of Japan's Ambassadors in Washington seemed to be opposed to the statements of the Japanese leaders and Press in Tokyo. The British and Dutch representatives agreed to consult their Governments and to report their opinions to Mr. Hull.
Mr. Hull met Nomura and Kurusu on the afternoon of 22nd November 1941. He informed them of the meeting held that morning and of his expectation of a decision by the conference on the following Monday, 26th November. Nomura and Kurusu pressed for an expression of the American attitude independently of the British and Dutch opinions. Mr. Hull replied that all of the Powers concerned were anxious that the pressing problems in the South Pacific be resolved, but from that viewpoint the latest proposal was not sufficient. On 22nd November, TOGO cabled Nomura that the 29th November was the latest date for the conclusion of an agreement as "after that things are automatically going to happen".
Nomura and Kurusu met Mr. Hull again on 26th November. Mr. Hull, after pointing out that the "Proposal B" violated the four fundamental principles which he had enunciated early in the negotiations and to which the United States of America was committed, informed the Ambassadors that the American Government was of the opinion that the adoption of the proposals would not contribute to ultimate peace in the Pacific. Mr. Hull suggested that further efforts be made to reach an agreement on the practical application of these four fundamental principles. With that object in view, he offered a new draft proposal which in its essence provided for enforcement of the four fundamental principles in the Far East, and which contemplated a multilateral agreement among the United States of America, Great Britain, China, Japan, the Netherlands, Thailand and the U.S.S.R. for withdrawal of Japanese forces from China and for maintaining the territorial integrity of that country.
The proposed agreement provided that Japan and the United States of America, with a view to ensuring a lasting peace in the Pacific, would declare (1) that they had no designs on the territory of other nations, (2) that they would not use military force aggressively, (3) that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of other states, and (4) that they would settle international disputes by peaceful processes. These were the four general principles which Mr. Hull had stated as early as 16th April 1941, and which the United States of America had all along insisted must be agreed upon in principle and applied in practice. They were principles to which Japan had, prior to 1930, repeatedly stated her adherence, but which she had since that date often infringed in practice.
In the domain of international commerce, it was proposed (1) that there should be no discrimination as between nationals of different states, (2) that excessive restrictions on the flow of international trade should be abolished, (3) that there should be access without discrimination by the nationals of all states to raw materials, and (4) that trade agreements between states should ensure the protection of the interests of the populations of countries which must import goods for consumption. these were principles to which Japan in her dependence on international trade and as a large importer of goods for consumption could hardly object, and indeed there had already been agreement on the substance of them in the course of the prior negotiations. But the practical application of all the above principles was a different matter. Japan had waged a war of aggression against China for years, in the course of which she had possessed herself of Manchuria, had occupied a large part of the rest of China, and had controlled and diverted much of Chinese economy to her own uses. She had no obtained the essential bases in French Indo-China for, had made all the preparations for, and was poised to launch a new series of predatory attacks upon her neighbors to the South. She hoped that these would secure for her the booty of her past aggressions and the further territories and materials she required to make her dominant in East Asia and the Western and Southern Pacific. The practical application of the above principles would involve the surrender of the fruits of her past aggression and the abandonment of her schemes for further aggression towards the South.
From the beginning of the negotiations, the United States of America had steadfastly insisted on an acknowledgment of the principles she stated, and Hull had repeatedly called attention to the necessity of working out the translation of these principles into practice. In the early stages of the negotiations, Japan had evaded giving an unequivocal declaration of agreement with the principles. About the month of August 1941, Konoye succeeded after great difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Military to his informing the United States of America that Japan accepted the four principles. As we have seen, this was a mere empty gesture. There was no intention to apply the principles. The leaders of Japan had never been prepared to give practical application to the principles, to surrender the booty of the past and to abandon the booty in prospect. They had carried on the negotiations in that knowledge, although they had all along been warned by the United States of America that the practical application of the principles was an essential to any agreement. Some of them apparently hoped by a mixture of military threat and diplomatic manoeuvre to persuade the United States of America to relax the application of her principles so far at least as to allow Japan to retain the dominant position she had seized in Manchuria and China. They were not certain that Japan would emerge victorious from a war with the United States of America and the Western Powers, and, if they could persuade these powers to acquiesce in the position Japan had secured in Manchuria and the rest of China, they were prepared to abandon, for a while, the projected advance to the South. Others of them did not believe that the Powers could be so beguiled and only acquiesced in the protraction of the negotiations until those who were more hopeful should be persuaded that the beguilement was impossible -- which would make for national unity -- and until Japan's preparations for war should be completed.
In his note of 26th November, Hull detailed certain measures which were essential if the principles were to be acknowledged and put into practice. These were (1) that there should be a non-aggression pact among all the nations with interests in the Far East, (2) that all these nations should reject preferential treatment in their economic relations with French Indo-China, (3) that Japan should withdraw her armed forces from China and French Indo-China, and (4) that Japan should withdraw all support from her puppet government in China.
This suggested practical application of the principles brought the leaders of Japan sharply face to face with reality. They had never been prepared to apply the principles in practice and were not prepared to do so now. Their preparations for war were now complete. The fleet which was to strike at Pearl Harbor sailed this day in the early morning. They unanimously resolved to go to war and so to manipulate the diplomatic exchange that their military forces would be able to attack the armed forces of the United States of America and Britain at the chosen points before warning, through the breaking off of the negotiations, could reach them.
Komura and Kurusu cabled TOGO that their failure and humiliation were complete. On 27th November, the Japanese Foreign Office instructed Kurusu not to break off negotiations. TOGO telegraphed Nomura and Kurusu on 28th November, He said, "In spite of the efforts you two Ambassadors have made, it is surprising and regrettable that such a proposal as the recent one (Mr. Hull's proposal of 26th November) had been made to Japan by the United States. It is impossible for us to negotiate on the basis of their proposal. WIth the submission of the Imperial Government's opinion of the American proposal (which will be telegraphed in two or three days) the situation will be such that there will be nothing left but to practically drop the negotiation. But, we wish you to refrain from giving the impression to the United States that the negotiation is broken off. Tell them that you are waiting for instructions from your Government." On the 29th November 1941, the Japanese Foreign Office instructed Kurusu and Nomura to make certain representations to the United States State Department but to be careful not to say anything which could be construed as a rupture of the negotiations. The Foreign Office repeated this warning to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington on the 30th November.
KIDO had discussed the situation with the Emperor on 19th November. He advised the Emperor that if the war should be commenced merely because the time limit for the negotiations had expired, it might subject the Emperor to undue criticism and that, therefore, the Premier should be ordered to convene another Imperial Conference, in which the former Prime Ministers would be allowed to participate, before giving his sanction to commencement of the war. At a later conference between KIDO and the Emperor on 26th November, they decided that under the circumstances, another Imperial Conference upon the war should be held. Accordingly, on the morning of 29th November, the Jushin, or Council of Senior Statesmen, was convened in preparation for their meeting with the Emperor later in the day. During the morning session, TOJO, SUZUKI, SHIMADA, TOGO, and KIMURA were present. TOJO explained the inevitability of war with the United States. After an interval, the Jushin and TOJO met with the Emperor, who heard each man's opinion in turn. TOJO gave the Governments' point of view. The discussion proceeded upon the theory that war was inevitable, as TOJO had said, and HIRANUMA, as well as the other members of the Jushin, with the exception of HIROTA and Konoye, contented themselves with giving advice based on that assumption.
Liaison Conference 30 November 1941
The Liaison Conference which met on 30th November was the conference at which the final details for the attack upon the Allied Powers was agreed upon. TOJO, SHIMADA, TOGO, KAYA, SUZUKI, MUTO, OKA, and HOSHINO were present. The planned attack upon Pearl Harbor was freely discussed. The form and substance of the note to the Government of the United States rejecting Mr. Hull's draft proposal of the 26th and implying a rupture in the negotiations at Washington was agreed upon. It was agreed that a declaration of war would not be necessary. The time of delivery of the note was discussed. TOJO said that there were various theories advanced as to the time that should elapse between the delivery of the note implying a rupture in the negotiations and the actual attack upon Pearl Harbor. He said that some thought an hour-and-a-half should be the time allowed, and that other periods of time suggested were one hour, thirty minutes, etc. All agreed that the time of delivery of the note should not be permitted to destroy the element of surprise in the attack. MUTO said it was finally decided to allow the Navy General Staff to decide upon the time to be allowed between the delivery of the note and the beginning of the attack; that the Navy General Staff was to estimate when their operations would take place and then notify the Liaison Conference of the time at which the United States could be notified.
Imperial Conference 1st December 1941
The Imperial Conference called to sanction the decisions made at the Liaison Conference on 30th November met on 1st December. TOJO, TOGO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, HOSHINO, MUTO and OKA were present, among others. TOJO presided at the conferences; he explained the purpose of the conference, and thereafter the Ministers and the Chiefs-of-Staff discussed the question from the standpoint of their responsibility. The question of war or peace with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The decision was in favor of war. The record of that decision reads, "Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy, adopted 5th November, have finally failed. Japan will open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands." KIDO recorded in his diary: "At 2 p.m. the Imperial Conference was held, and at last, the war against the United States was decided upon. At 4:30 p.m. the Prime Minister visited me to discuss the Imperial Rescript to Declare War." The next day, that is to say 2nd December, the Imperial General Headquarters issued the order designating 8th December as X-Day, but as we have seen this date had already been fixed by Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 3 of 10th November 1941.
Admiral Yamamoto issued an order from his flagship in Hiroshima Bay on 22nd November 1941, which was directed to the carrier task force then in its rendezvous at Tankan Wan. the order was to the effect that the force would move out of Tankan Wan on 26th November and proceed without being detected to Latitude 40 degrees North, Longitude 170 degrees West, so as to arrive there by 3rd December. Refueling was to be carried out there as quickly as possible. On the morning of 26th November, the carrier task force steamed out of Tankan Wan, headed for its refueling point. The force consisted of Japan's six large aircraft carriers, as well as battleships and destroyers and other craft. Admiral Nagumo had issued the simple order, "Attack Pearl Harbor!" Nothing further was necessary, for on 23rd November he had issued detailed orders for the attack.
Termination of Negotiations with United States of America
In Washington, the peace negotiations were continuing. President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu held a conversation on 27th November 1941 from 2:30 p.m. for a period of about an hour. After this interview, Kurusu attempted to carry on a telephone conversation with a member of the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo, in which he displayed an ignorance of voice code but a surprising knowledge of the plans of the TOJO Cabinet to use the negotiations in Washington as a screen to cover the attack upon the Allied possessions in the Pacific. He was advised that the attack was imminent and that he was expected to keep the negotiations going at all costs, in effect, that the appearance of continued negotiations was to be maintained although "the date set . . . has come and gone". The United States was to be prevented "from becoming unduly suspicious'.
At about 10 a.m. on 7th December 1941 (Washington time 8 p.m. 6th December), TOGO's message to Nomura and Kurusu transmitting the note to be delivered to the United States Government in reply to the United States draft proposal of 26th November and implying a rupture in the negotiations began to arrive in Washington. It was transmitted in several parts. In one part, TOGO informed Nomura that, "Although the exact time for presenting the note to America will be telegraphed later, all necessary preparations should be made upon receipt of this memorandum so that it can be carried out as soon as instructions for such action are received".
President Roosevelt, in a final effort to reach a peaceful settlement with the Japanese Government, dispatched a personal message to the Japanese Emperor. The message was sent to the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Grew, with instructions to deliver it to the Emperor. This message reached Tokyo at noon, and although its contents were known to Japanese Officials in the course of the afternoon, it was not delivered to Mr. Grew until nine o'clock that night. As soon as he had decoded the message, Mr. Grew called upon Foreign Minister TOGO at 15 minutes after midnight on the morning of 8th December 1941, and requested an audience with the Emperor for the purpose of delivering the message; but TOGO informed Mr. Grew that he would present the message to the Throne. Mr. grew took his leave at 30 minutes after midnight (Washington time 10:30 a.m., 7th December 1941). By this time, the two countries were at war, as the Naval Operations Orders already referred to fixed 0000 hours of the 8th December (Tokyo time) as the time at which "a state of war will exist". The attack upon Kota Bharu commenced at 1:25 a.m. and upon Pearl Harbor at 3:20 a.m. (both Tokyo time). No satisfactory explanation of the delay in delivering to Mr. Grew the President's message to the Emperor was given to this Tribunal. Whatever effect that message might have had was precluded by this unexplained delay.
Pearl Harbor
The Japanese Task Force had proceeded to carry out its operation orders as scheduled. One hour after Mr. Grew had taken his leave of TOGO, that is to say at 1:30 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Pearl Harbor time, 6 a.m., 7th December) (Washington time, 11:30 a.m., 7th December), the planes which were to deliver the first attack on Pearl Harbor took off from the decks of their carriers at a point approximately 230 miles north of Pearl Harbor. Ambassador Nomura in Washington had asked for an appointment to see Secretary Hull at 3 a.m., 8th December 1941) Washington time, 1 p.m., 7th December), but he later telephones and asked that the appointment be postponed to 3:45 a.m., 8th December 1941) (Washington time, 1:45 pm., 7th December). Before Nomura called upon Mr. Hull, the first assault upon Pearl Harbor was delivered at 3:20 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Pearl Harbor time, 7:50 a.m., 7th December) (Washington time, 1:20 p.m., 7th December). Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu arrived at Secretary Hull's office at 4:05 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 2:05 p.m., 7th December), which was 45 minutes after the first attack was actually delivered at Pearl Harbor, and were not received by Mr. Hull until one hour after the attack had begun. The Japanese Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to deliver his message at 3 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 1 p.m., 7th December), but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to trouble in decoding and transcribing the message. The Secretary asked why he had been told to deliver the message at the specific hour of 1 p.m. Washington time. the Ambassador replied that he did not know, but that was his instruction. It is true that TOGO had telegraphed instructions to Nomura on 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 7th December), as follows: "Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time". A second attack was delivered upon Pearl Harbor by horizontal bombers from 4:10 a.m. to 4:45 a.m. (Pearl Harbor time, 8:40 a.m. to 9:15 a.m.), and a third attack was delivered by dive bombers from 4:45 a.m. to 5:15 a.m. (Pearl Harbor time 9:15 a.m. to 9:45 a.m.).
Kota Bharu
Forty-five minutes after Mr. Grew had taken his leave of TOGO in Tokyo, that is to say at 1:25 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Kota Bharu time, 11:45 p.m., 7th December) (Washington time, 11:25 a.m., 7th December), the beach defence troops on the Badang and Sabak Beaches on the east coast of British Malaya, the point of junction of which at Kuala Peamat is about one-and-a-half miles northeast of Kota Bharu Airfield, reported ships anchoring off the coast. TOJO said that these ships had sailed from Saigon in French Indo-China. At 1:40 a.m., 8th December 1941( Kota Bharu time, midnight 7th December) (Washington time, 11:40 a.m., 7th December), these ships began shelling the beaches. This was one hour and twenty minutes before the time at which it had originally been arranged that Kurusu and Nomura should call on Mr. Hull with the Japanese note and two hours and twenty-five minutes before they actually arrived at Secretary Hull's office. About 2:05 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Kota Bharu time, 12:25 a.m., 8th December) the first wave of Japanese troops landed at the junction of Badang and Sabak Beaches. Having secured the first line of beach defences, the Japanese began the second phase of their landing operations against the British Malaya Peninsula. This second phase was a landing operation at Singora and Patani, which towns were located just north of the boundary between British Malay and Thailand, and were therefore in Thailand. This second landing began at 3:05 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Kota Bharu time, 1:25 a.m., 8th December) (Washington time, 1:05 p.m., 7th December). Air reconnaissance revealed that the Japanese ships were disembarking troops at Singora and Patani and that the airdrome at Singora was under occupation by the Japanese landing party. The Japanese forces later crossed the Malaya-Thailand Border at Pedang Besar and at Kroh to execute a flanking movement against Kota Bharu.
An air raid was made upon the City of Singapore in British Malaya by Japanese planes beginning at 6:10 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Singapore time, 4:30 a.m., 8th December) (Washington time, 4:10 p.m., 7th December). These attacking planes came from bases in French Indo-China according to TOJO and from carriers off-shore. Bombs were dropped on the Seletar and Tengah airfields, as well as on the city.
The Philippines, Wake and Guam
The first attack on the Island ofGuam was delivered at 8:05 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 6:05 p.m., 7th December), when eight Japanese bombers came through the clouds and dropped bombs in the vicinity of the Cable Station and Pan American compound.
During the early morning hours of 8th December 1941 (Wake and Washington time, 7th December), the attack began on Wake Island with bombing by Japanese planes.
The Philippines received their first attacks on the morning of 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 7th December) also. Heavy bombing attacks were made by the Japanese forces on the city of Davao on the Island of Mindanao and on Clark Field on the Island of Luzon.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong received its first attack at 9:00 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Hong Kong time, 8:00 a.m. 8th December) (Washington time, 7:00 p.m. 7th December). Although war had not been declared against Great Britain, a broadcast from the Tokyo Radio, which was in code and which gave warning to the Japanese nationals that war with Great Britain and the United States was imminent, had been picked up by the authorities at Hong Kong around 5:45 a.m. 8th December 1941. This warning allowed the defenders of Hong Kong to make some preparation for the expected attack.
Shanghai
The third invasion of Shanghai began in the early morning hours of 8th December (Washington time, 7th December) when Japanese patrols were observed crossing the Garden Bridge over Soochow Creek and running military telephone lines as they went. Thewy met no opposition and were able to take over the Bund without difficulty. They had taken complete possession of it by 4:00 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Shanghai time, 3:00 a.m. 8th December) (Washington time, 2:00 p.m., 7th December).
The Japanese Note Delivered in Washington on 7th December 1941
Hague Convention No. III of 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, provides by its first Article "The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war". That Convention was binding on Japan at all relevant times. Under the Charter of the Tribunal, the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances is declared to be a crime. [Emphasis added.] Many of the charges in the indictment are based wholly or partly upon the view that the attacks against Britain and the United States were delivered without previous and explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. For reasons which are discussed elsewhere, we have decided that it is unnecessary to deal with these charges. In the case of counts of the indictment which charge conspiracy to wage aggressive wars and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances we have come to the conclusion that the charge of conspiracy to wage aggressive wars has been made out, that these acts are already criminal in the highest degree, and that it is unnecessary to consider whether the charge has also been established in respect of the list of treaties, agreements and assurances -- including Hague Convention III -- which the indictment alleges to have been broken. We have come to a similar conclusion in respect to the counts which allege the waging of wars of aggression and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances. With regard to the counts of the indictment which charge murder in respect that wars were waged in violation of Hague Convention No. III of 1907 or of other treaties, we have decided that the wars in the course of which these killings occurred were all wars of aggression. The waging of such wars is the major crime, since it involves untold killings, suffering and misery. No good purpose would be served by convicting any defendant of that major crime and also of "murder" eo nomie. Accordingly, it si unnecessary for us to express a concluded opinion upon the exact extent of the obligation imposed by Hague Convention III of 1907. It undoubtedly imposes the obligation of giving previous and explicit warning before hostilities are commenced, but it does not define the period which must be allowed between the giving of this warning and the commencement of hostilities. The position was before the framers of the Convention and has been the subject of controversy among international lawyers ever since the Convention was made. This matter of the duration of the period between warning and hostilities is of course vital. If that period is not sufficient to allow of the transmission of the warning to armed forces in outlying territories and to permit them to put themselves in a state of defence, they may be shot down without a chance to defend themselves. It was the existence of this controversy as to the exact extent of the obligation imposed by the Convention which opened the way for TOGO to advise the Liaison Conference of 30th November 1941 that various opinions were held as to the period of warning which was obligatory, that some thought it should be an hour and a half, some an hour, some half an hour. The Conference left it to TOGO and the two chiefs of Staff to fix the time of the delivery of the Note to Washington with the injunction that that time must not interfere with the success of the surprise attack. In short, they decided to give notice that negotiations were broken off at so short an interval before they commenced hostilities as to ensure that the armed forces of Britain and the United States at the points of attack could not be warned that negotiations were broken off. TOGO and the naval and military men, to whom the task had been delivered, arranged that the Note should be delivered in Washington at 1:00 p.m. on 7th December 1941. The first attack on Pearl Harbor was delivered at 1:20 p.m. Had all gone well, they would have allowed twenty minutes for Washington to warn the armed forces at Pearl Harbor. But so anxious were they to ensure that the attack would be a surprise, that they allowed no margin for contingencies. Thus, through the decoding and transcription of the Note in the Japanese Embassy taking longer than had been estimated, the Japanese Ambassadors did not in fact arrive with the Note at Secretary Hull's office in Washington until 45 minutes after the attack had been delivered. As for the attack on Britain at Kota Bharu, it was never related to the time (1:00 p.m.) fixed for the delivery of the Note at Washington. This fact has not been adequately explained in the evidence. The attack was delivered at 11:40 a.m. Washington time, one hour and twenty minutes before the Note should have been delivered if the Japanese Embassy at Washington had been able to carry out the instructions it had received from Tokyo.
We have thought it right to pronounce the above findings in fact, for these matters have been the subject of much evidence and argument, but mainly in order to draw pointed attention to the defects of the Convention as framed. It permits of a narrow construction and tempts the unprincipled to try to comply with the obligation thus narrowly construed, while at the same time ensuring that their attacks shall come as a surprise. With the margin thus reduced for the purpose of surprise, no allowance can be made for error, mishap or negligence leading to delay in the delivery of the warning, and the possibility is high that the prior warning which the Convention makes obligatory will not in fact be given. TOJO stated that the Japanese Cabinet had this in view, for they envisaged that the more the margin was reduced, the greater the possibility of mishap.
My apologies for the intrusion, but the preceding section strikes the editor as highly confusing: if the Note had been delivered an hour or day or even a year before the attack, it in no way constitutes a "reasoned declaration of war" or an "ultimatum with conditional declaration of war" as required by the Convention. It simply declares the existing negotiations at an impasse. The Note does not even declare a rupture in diplomatic relations, let alone threaten or declare war.
Further, even if one intuits a declaration that would satisfy the Convention, not even this sorry excuse for a declaration was delivered to the British or Dutch governments at any time.
As shown in the following section, the Japanese Government did not even begin consideration of a formal declaration of war until well after the attacks had begun.
The Formal Declaration of War
The Japanese Privy Council's Committee of Investigation did not begin the consideration of the question of making a formal declaration of war upon the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands until 7:30 a.m., 8th December (Tokyo time), when it met in the Imperial Palace for that purpose at that time. SHIMADA announced that the attacks had been made upon Pearl Harbor and Kota Bharu; and a bill declaring war on the United States and Great Britain, which had been drafted at the residence of HOSHINO during the night, was introduced. In answer to a question during the deliberations on the bill, TOJO declared in referring to the peace negotiations at Washington that, "those negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy". TOJO also declared during the deliberations that war would not be declared on the Netherlands in view of future strategic convenience; and that a declaration fo war against Thailand would not be made, as negotiations were in progress between Japan and Thailand for the conclusion of "an Alliance Pact". The Bill was approved; and it was decided to submit it to the Privy Council. The Privy Council met at 10:50 a.m., 8th December 1941 and passed the Bill. The Imperial Rescript declaring war against the United States and Great Britain was issued between 11:40 and 12:00 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 10:40 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., 7th December) (London time, 2:40 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., 8th December). Having been attacked, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declared war on Japan on 9th December 1941 (London and Washington, 8th December). On the same day, the Netherlands, Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Free France, Canada and China also declared war on Japan. The next day, MUTO stated in a conversation with the Chief of Operations of the Army General Staff that the sending of Ambassador Kurusu to the United States was nothing more than a sort of camouflage of events leading to the opening of hostilities.
Conclusion [Regarding Wars of Aggression]
It remains to consider the contention advanced on behalf of the defendants that Japan's acts of aggression against France, her attack against the Netherlands, and her attacks on Great Britain and the United States of America were justifiable measures of self-defence. It is argued that these Powers took such measures to restrict the economy of Japan that she had no way of preserving the welfare and prosperity of her nationals but to go to war.
The measures which were taken by these Powers to restrict Japanese trade were taken in an entirely justifiable attempt to induce Japan to depart from a course of aggression on which she had long been embarked and upon which she had determined to continue. Thus, the United States of America gave notice to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan on 26th July 1939, after Japan had seized Manchuria and a large part of the rest of China, and when the existence of the treaty had long ceased to induce Japan to respect the rights and interests of the nationals of the United States in China. It was given in order that some other means might be tried to induce Japan to respect these rights. Thereafter, the successive embargoes which were imposed on the export of materials to Japan were imposed as it became clearer and clearer that Japan had determined to attack the territories and interests of the Powers. They were imposed in an attempt to induce Japan to depart from the aggressive policy on which she had determined, and in order that the Powers might no longer supply Japan with the materials to wage war upon them. In some cases, as for example in the case of the embargo on the export of oil from the United States of America to Japan, these measures were also taken in order to build up the supplies which were needed by the nations who were resisting the aggressors. The argument is indeed merely a repetition of Japanese propaganda issued at the time she was preparing for her wars of aggression. It is not easy to have patience with its lengthy repetition at this date, when documents are at length available which demonstrate that Japan's decision to expand to the North, to the West and to the South at the expense of her neighbors was taken long before any economic measures were directed against her, and was never departed from. The evidence clearly establishes, contrary to the contention of the defense, that the acts of aggression against France, and the attacks on Britain, the United States of America and the Netherlands were prompted by the desire to deprive China of any aid in the struggle she was waging against Japan's aggression, and to secure for Japan the possessions of her neighbors in the South.
The Tribunal is of opinion that the leaders of Japan in the years 1940 and 1941 planned to wage wars of aggression against France in French Indo-China. they had determined to demand that France cede to Japan the right to station troops and the right to air bases and naval bases in French Indo-China, and they had prepared to use force against France if their demands were not granted. They did make such demands upon France under threat that they would use force to obtain them, if that should prove necessary. In her then situation, France was compelled to yield to the threat of force and granted the demands.
The Tribunal also finds that a war of aggression was waged against the Republic of France. The occupation by Japanese troops of portions of French Indo-China, which Japan had forced France ot accept, did not remain peaceful. As the war situation, particularly in the Philippines, turned against Japan, the Japanese Supreme War Council, in February 1945, decided to submit the following demands to the Governor of French Indo-China: (1) that all French troops and armed police be placed under Japanese command, and 92) that all means of communication and transportation necessary for military action be placed under Japanese control. These demands were presented to the Governor of French Indo-China on 9th March 1945, in the form of an ultimatum backed by the threat of military action. He was given two hours to refuse or accept. He refused, and the Japanese proceeded to enforce their demands by military action. French troops and military police resisted the attempt to disarm them. There was fighting in Hanoi, Saigon, Phnom-Penh, Nhatrang, and towards the Northern frontier. We quote the official Japanese account, "In the Northern frontiers the Japanese had considerable losses. The Japanese army proceeded to suppress French detachments which had fled to the mountains. In a month public order was re-established except in remote places". The Japanese Supreme War Council had decided that, if Japan's demands were refused and military action was taken to enforce them, "the two countries will not be considered as at war". This Tribunal finds that Japanese actions at that time constituted the waging of a war of aggression against the Republic of France.
The Tribunal is further of opinion that the attacks which Japan launched on 7th December 1941 against Britain, the United States of America, and the Netherlands were wars of aggression. They were unprovoked attacks, prompted by the desire to seize the possessions of these nations. Whatever may be the difficulty of stating a comprehensive definition of "a war of aggression", attacks made with the above motive cannot but be characterized as wars of aggression.
It was argued on behalf of the defendants that, in as much as the Netherlands took the initiative in declaring war on Japan, the war which followed cannot be described as a war of aggression by Japan. The facts are that Japan had long planned to secure for herself a dominant position in the economy of the Netherlands East Indies by negotiation or by force of arms if negotiation failed. By the middle of 1941, it was apparent that the Netherlands would not yield to the Japanese demands. The leaders of Japan then planned and completed all preparations for invading and seizing the Netherlands East Indies. The orders issued to the Japanese army for this invasion have not been recovered, bu the orders issued to the Japanese navy on 5th November 1941 have been adduced in evidence. This is the Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1 already referred to. The expected enemies are stated to be the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The order states that the day for the outbreak of war will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters order, and that after 0000 hours on that day a state of war will exist and the Japanese forces will commence operations according to the plan. The order of Imperial General Headquarters was issued on 10th November and it fixed 8th December (Tokyo time), 7th December (Washington time) as the date on which a state of war would exist and operations would commence according to the plan. In the very first stage of the operations so to be commenced, it is stated that the Southern Area Force will annihilate enemy fleets in the Philippines, British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies area. There is no evidence that the above order was ever recalled or altered in respect to the above particulars. In these circumstances we find in fact that orders declaring the existence of a state of war and for the execution of a war of aggression by Japan against the Netherlands were in effect from the early morning of 7th December 1941. The fact that the Netherlands, being fully apprised of the imminence of the attack, in self defence declared war against Japan on 8th December and thus officially recognized the existence of a state of war which had been begun by Japan cannot change that war from a war of aggression on the part of Japan into something other than that. In fact, Japan did not declare war against the Netherlands until 11th January 1942 when her troops landed in the Netherlands East Indies. The Imperial Conference of 1st December 1941 decided that "Japan will open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands". Despite this decision to open hostilities against the Netherlands, and despite the fact that orders for the execution of hostilities against the Netherlands were already in effect, TOJO announced to the Privy Council on 8th December (Tokyo time) when they passed the Bill making a formal declaration of war against the United States of American and Britain that war would not be declared on the Netherlands in view of future strategic convenience. The reason for this was not satisfactorily explained in evidence. The Tribunal is inclined to the view that it was dictated by the policy decided in October 1940 for the purpose of giving as little time as possible for the Dutch to destroy oil wells. It has no bearing, however, on the fact that Japan launched a war of aggression against the Netherlands.
The position of Thailand is special. The evidence bearing upon the entry of Japanese troops into Thailand is meagre to a fault. It is clear that there was complicity between the Japanese leaders and the leaders of Thailand in the years 1939 and 1490 when Japan forced herself on France as mediator in the dispute as to the border between French Indo-China and thailand. There is no evidence that the position of complicity and confidence between Japan and Thailand, which was then achieved, was altered before December 1941. It is proved that the Japanese leaders planned to secure a peaceful passage for their troops through Thailand into Malay by agreement with Thailand. They did not wish to approach Thailand for such an agreement until the moment when they were about to attack Malaya, lest the news of the imminence of that attack should leak out. The Japanese troops marched through the territory of Thailand unopposed on 7th December 1941 (Washington time). The only evidence the prosecution has adduced as to the circumstances of that march is (1) a statement made to the Japanese Privy Council between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time) that an agreement for the passage of the troops was being negotiated, (2) a Japanese broadcast announcement that they had commenced friendly advancement into Thailand on the afternoon of the 8th December (Tokyo time) (Washington time, 7th December), and that Thailand had facilitated the passage by concluding an agreement at 12:30 p.m., and (3) a conflicting statement, also introduced by the prosecution, that Japanese troops landed at Singora and Patani in Thailand at 3:05 in the morning of 8th December (Tokyo time). On 21st December 1941, Thailand concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan. No witness on behalf of Thailand has complained of Japan's actions as being acts of aggression. In these circumstances, we are left without reasonable certainty that the Japanese advance into Thailand was contrary to the wishes of the Government of Thailand and the charges that the defendants initiated and waged a war of aggression against the Kingdom of Thailand remain unproved.
Count 31 charges that a war of aggression was waged against the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Imperial Rescript which was issued about 12 noon on 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time) states "We hereby declare war in the United States of America and the British Empire." There is a great deal of lack of precision in the use of terms throughout the many --
plans which were formulated of an attack on British possessions. Thus, such terms as "Britain", "Great Britain", and "England" are used without discrimination and apparently used as meaning the same thing. In this case, there is no doubt as to the entity which is designated by "the British Empire". The correct titel of that entity is "the British Commonwealth of Nations". That by the use of the term "the British Empire" they intended the entity which is more correctly called "the British Commonwealth of Nations" is clear when we consider the terms of the Combined Fleet Operations Order No. 1 already referred to. That order provides that a state of war will exist after 0000 hours X-Day, which was 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time), and that the Japanese forces would then commence operations. It is provided that in the very first phase of the operations, the "South Seas Force" will be ready for the enemy fleet in the Australia area. Later, it was provided that "The following are areas expected to be occupied or destroyed as quickly as operational conditions permit, a, Eastern New Guinea, New Britain". These were governed by the Commonwealth of Australia under mandate from the League of Nations. The areas to be destroyed or occupied are also stated to include "Strategic points in teh Australia area". Moreover, "important points in the Australian coast" were to be mined. Now the Commonwealth of Australia is not accurately described as being part of "Great Britain", which is the term used in teh Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 1, nor is it accurately described as being part of "the British Empire", which is the term used in the Imperial Rescript. It is properly designated as part of "the British Commonwealth of Nations". It is plain therefore that the entity against which hostilities were to be directed and against which the declaration of war was directed was "the British Commonwealth of Nations", and Count 31 is well-founded when it charges that a war of aggression was waged against the British Commonwealth of Nations.
It is charged in Count 30 of the Indictment that a war of aggression was waged against the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The Philippines during the period of the war were not a completely sovereign state. So far as international relations were concerned, they were part of the United States of America. It is beyond doubt that a war of aggression was waged agasint the people of the Philippines. For the sake of technical accuracy we shall consider the aggression against the people of the Philippines as being a part of the war of aggression waged against the United States of America.