a. When briefed on the concept of the operation of TF Barker into the Son My area, he did not insure that the plan included provisions for handling, screening, and treatment of noncombatants and refugees.
b. After observing the bodies of noncombatnats in and around My Lai (4) during the morning of 16 March, and despite his knowledge that C Company had not encountered resistance, he failed to take effective action to prevent further killing of noncombatants by C Company.
c. He failed to take any action to insure that medical treatment was provided to noncombatants in the Son My area on 16 March.
d. After C Company had reported killing 84 VC in My Lai (4) by 0840 hours on 16 March, he either participated in or condoned the making of fictitious reports to higher headquarters and false entries in official records to the effect that 69 VC had been killed by artillery at a location north of My Lai (4).
e. Having observed on 16 March that many of the dwellings and other structures in My Lai (4) were being burned in violation of division policy and the provisions of pertinent directives, he failed to take any effective action to:
(1) Stop such destruction.
(2) Report the facts to higher headquarters.
f. Having observed the bodies of women and children in and around My Lai (4) on 16 March, and after receiving subsequent reports and information on the same day indicating that many additional noncombatants may have been killed by artillery or gunship, he failed to initiate:
(1) An immediate investigation to determine the extent and the causes of the casualties.
(2) An investigation of an artillery incident, or to recommend that such an investigation be initiated, as required by USARV and Americal Division directives.
(3) A SIR as required by regulations.
g. Having been directed to investigate and report to his commanding officer concerning the Thompson Report and after personally hearing from W01 Thompson, CWO Culverhouse, and SP Colburn accounts of their observations of the events in Son My Village he failed to make an appropriate investigation to determine the truth of such reports.
h. Having been directed to investigate and report to his commanding officer concerning the report of W01 Thompson; having personally interrogated Thompson, Culverhouse, and Colburn; and having failed to make a genuine investigation of their reports, he:
(1) Made a series of false and misleading reports to his commanding officer to the effect that:
(a) He had made a thorough investigation of the Thompson Report.
(b) He had interrogated all of the commanders and many of the soldiers and aviation personnel involved.
(c) W01 Thompson was the only person he had found who had seen anything unusual on 16 March.
(d) There was no substance to Thompson's allegations.
(2) Concealed the existence of war crimes.
i. About mid-April 1968, having received information that (1) the Son Tinh District Chief had submitted a report to the Quang Ngai Province Chief alleging that US forces had killed approximately 500 noncombatants in Tu Cung and Co Luy hamlets of Son My Village on 16 March 1968, and (2) VC propaganda broadcasts were stressing that US forces had killed a large number of noncombatants in the Son My Village on 16 March 1968, he:
(1) Failed to conduct any investigation of the allegations of the district Chief.
(2) Falsely informed the CG, 2d ARVN Division, and the Province Chief that he had previously investigated similar allegations respecting the 16 March operation and had found them to be entirely without substance.
j. Having been subsequently directed to investigate the allegations of the District Chief and the VC propaganda, and to submit a written report incorporating the evidence he claimed to have collected in response to the Thompson Report, and having made no invesdiiqation of such allegations, he submitted to his commanding officer a written Report of Investigation, dated 24 April 1968, which was false and misleading in the following particulars:
(1) While the document purported to be a "Report of Investigation" and implied that he had made an investigation in response to the allegations of the District Chief, no proper investigation was ever conducted.
(2) It avoided any reference to the Thompson Report.
(3) It falsely stated that his interviews with the TF Barker S3 and the commanders involved revealed that at no time were civilians gathered together and killed by US soldiers.
(4) It falsely stated that 20 noncombatants were inadvertently killed by preparatory fires and in the cross fires of US and VC forces on 16 March 1968.
k. It appears that in conjunction with one or more members of his command, and possibly of the Province Advisory Team, he conspired to withhold and suppress facts concerning the actions of elements of TF Barker on 16 March and information regarding the origin of and basis for a statement dated 14 April 1968 prepared by CPT Rodriguez.
l. He gave false testimony before the Inquiry in a manner calculated to mislead this Inquiry in many particulars. For example, he testified that:
(1) On 16 March 1968 he observed the bodies of only 6-8 women and children in and around My Lai (4).
(2) He directed LTC Luper to investigate whether any artillery rounds landed on My Lai (4) and that LTC Luper thereafter reported to him that an investigation had been made and had disclosed that no artillery had struck the village.
(3) W01 Thompson was the only individual he spoke with who had observed anything unusual on 16 March.
(4) He had not been directed to submit his written Report of Investigation, dated 24 April 1968, and that the Report was prepared and submitted in order to bring to MG Koster's attention reports and propaganda received from Vietnamese sources.
(5) In May 1968, MG Koster directed a formal investigation be conducted and,that he (COL Henderson) directed LTC Barker to conduct such an investigation.
(6) In May 1968, LTC Barker conducted an investigation and prepared a formal report of investigation, including 15-20 written statements of witnesses, which he (COL Henderson) then transmitted to Division.